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ABSTRACT
Certain aspects of statistical decision theory are applied to
assessing objectively the uncertainty involved in estimating which of
his courses of action (capabilities) an antagonist is pursuing in an
international conflict of interest situation. Observations are made by
a nation on its antagonist's conduct and interpreted as being associated
with its courses of action. Bayes formula is then used to change a con-
jectured a priori probability function over the antagonist's courses of
action in order to estimate the course of action being pursued by the
antagonist. A set of decision rules for selecting an appropriate course
of action to use against an antagonist's estimated course of action is
developed;, based on preference orderings and preference quantification.
The conclusions of this thesis are:
(1) in spite of uncertainty concerning the course of action being
pursued by an antagonist, it is possible to select an appropriate
course of action to be pursued when using decision rules based
on preference orderings and preference quantification .
(2) that an international conflict situation may be quantitatively assess-
ed.
This thesis was written at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, during the period January - May 1960. I am
indebted to Professors Thomas E. Oberbeck and Franklin F. Sheehan
for their continued patience, encouragement and most capable guidance
while acting as faculty advisors. I wish to thank Mrs. Norma Stevens
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This thesis concerns itself with the application of certain aspects
of statistical decision theory to decision making on policy implementa-
tion at a national level. The specific application made is in the domain
of foreign policy as it concerns two nations with a conflict of interest
situation existing between them.
Since World War IIj the Free World under the leadership of the
United States and the Communist Block under the leadership of the Soviet
Union have been engaged in a struggle to determine whether the nations
of the world will have the right to choose their own way of life and
their own form of government or whether the leaders of the Soviet Union
will dictate the conditions under which they will live. As yet the out-
come of this struggle has not yet been decided but the indications are
that we are losing this struggle, for since the close of World War II
the Soviet Union has extended its sphere of influence over the major
portion of the Eurasian land mass and its peoples and has begun to probe
for handholds in South America and Africa.
In the many small engagements that have characterized this struggle
so far the United States has had to make many decisions. In Korea for
example we were faced with the decisions as to how far north to allow
our forces to proceed and whether or not to permit our aircraft the
freedom of hot pursuit north of the Yalu River into Manchuria. Both of
the resulting decisions made at the time were made in the face of uncertain-
ty as to what Communist China and the U. S.S.R. would do. Hungary is an-
other example where we were faced with the prospect of having to make a

decision in which we were uncertain as to what our antagonist would do.
The result in this case was that effectively we did nothing. In Cuba
today the United States again is faced with a decision problem in which
there is uncertainty as to what Cuba intends to do.
It is interesting to speculate what course of action the United
States would have pursued had it known what the intentions of its
antagonist were in each of the above situations or, more realistically,
had it utilized a systematic and quantitative process for objectively
assessing the uncertainty in its estimate as to the intentions of our
antagonist. The United States, armed with information as to what course
of action our antagonist was pursuing, might have been able to select
a course of action, the results of which would have been more advanta-
geous to this nation and the Free World. The word "might" is used be-
cause of the fact that assuming such a course of action existed, we
might have been unwilling to pursue it since it violated our traditional
standards. For example, a course of action which dictates starting a
major war against Communist China would violate our tradition of not
initiating aggressive action against another nation.
For the foreseeable future these conflict of interest situations
will continue to arise as part of the overall 'protracted conflict"
characterized by Strausz-Hupe, Kintner, Dougherty and Cottrell in their
book entitled Protracted Conflict
. |6 . The United States in this
atmosphere will be repeatedly confronted with the enigma of making a
1
^ers in brackets refer to references in the bibliography,

decision in the face of uncertainty.
Morton A. Kaplan, Department of Political Science,, University of
Chicago, in his book System and Process in International Politics jl
discusses and formulates six distinct International Systems based on
the alignment of nations and relations within this alignment which
characterize them. In the latter portion of his book he discusses game
theory and its relation to the "solution" of conflict of interest situa-
tions in international politics, pointing out its limitations and draw-
backs.
Abraham Wald in his text entitled "Statistical Decision Functions"
1
4 points out that the statistical decision problem can be interpreted
as a two-person game. The author in this thesis chooses to view a con-
flict of interest situation as a statistical decision problem.
A conflict of interest situation involving the United States and
the Soviet Union can be considered as a two person game in which the
United States is a contestant playing against the Soviet Union. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union have courses of action, designat-
ed pure strategies in the language of game theory, which they can util-
ize in the given situation; these courses, which also may be character-
ized as capabilities of action, are actually a listing by the United
States of all the possible courses of action which it considers the
Soviet Union can pursue which are relevant to the particular situation
being considered
s
as well as a listing of its own capabilities. The
context of "course of action" is that the actions of a nation indicate
that it will utilize the enumerated course of action to gain its
objective. For example, troop and combat aircraft buildups in the

vicinity of Berlin by the Soviet Union might be interpreted by the
United States that the U.S.S.R. is pursuing a "hot war" course of
action in the Berlin crisis, while the U.S.S.R. °s permitting United
States aircraft to use routes outside the prescribed air corridors
while in flight to Berlin might be interpreted by the United States to
mean that the U.S.S.R. is pursuing a cold war' course of action in the
Berlin crisis.
On the other hand, the United States might construe the sending of
its armed forces into Lebanon as its "hot war" course of action while
the banning of trade with Communist China could be construed as its
"cold war" course of action.
Inasmuch as the U.S.S.R. is not going to inform us on the courses
of action which it is following, the advisors in the State Department
have the problem of estimating which course of action the U.S.S.R. is
pursuing in order to provide the President with a basis for making a
decision on a course of action by the United States to counter that
of the U.S.S.R. The course of action selected will be chosen relative
to a decision criterion from the list that the United States has pre-
pared of its capabilities, but the choice of this course of action will
depend in part on which estimated course of action the Soviet Union is
pursuing.
In the theory of this thesis, the advisors, in order to make their
estimates,, assign probabilities to the courses of action of the U.S.S.R..
These probabilities represent the probability with which the United States
conjectures (estimates) that the U.S.S.R. will use its courses of action
or mixture of courses of action. A mixture of courses of action is

interpreted as employment by the U. S.S.R. of all its courses of action
or some subset of its courses of action where the frequency with which
the individual courses of action are to be utilized has been carefully
predetermined by the U. S.S.R. and the order of their employment is
determined on a probabilistic basis. The advisors then observe the
conduct of the U. S.S.R. and interpret specific acts as one of a set
of possible courses of action of the Soviet Union. The observation
of the conduct of the Soviet Union may then be used to change the
assigned probabilities on the Soviet Union's courses of action through
the use of Bayes theorem which provides the quantative basis for chang-
ing these probabilities. The a priori probabilities required for the
use of Bayes theorem are the probabilities assigned by the United States
to the courses of action of the U. S.S.R. in an initial estimate of the
situation.
Bayes theorem and statistical decision theory will help the United
States to select the course of action it should pursue. Bayes theorem
improves the assessment of the uncertainty as to which of the conjectured
courses of action the U. S.S.R. is pursuing by changing the a priori pro-
babilities of the courses of action. The changed probabilities are then
known as a posteriori probabilities and these represent the United States
estimate of the probabilities that the U. S.S.R. is utilizing these partic-
ular courses of action. Statistical decision theory may be employed by
representatives of the United States to choose objectively an appropri-
ate course of action.
The onus of "judg.nent of values" is placed upon the decision maker
who utilizes the model
s
which will be constructed in the next chapter.

for formulating his decision. "Judgment of values" is particularly
important in determining the preference pattern for the possible out-
comes which result from the United States pursuing its courses of
action and the U.S.S.R. pursuing its courses of action. The decision
maker must be particularly careful that the resulting preference pat-
tern reflects the "true" ordering of preferences of the United States
for the outcomes and is not colored by his personal beliefs.
The solution of the decision maker's problem rests in the final
analysis on the selection of the "appropriate course of action" to
counter the antagonists estimated course of action. The words "appro-
priate course of action" are synonymous with the selection of a course
of action which is "optimal according to the criterion established for
making a decision." This criterion might be for example the maximiza-
tion of own national interests, these interests may be construed as
"utilities" for the possible outcomes which result from the possible
combinations of courses of action. It may be the minimization of the
"risks" involved in the courses of action or any criterion which has
meaning and "value" to the decision maker. In any event the decision
maker must establish the criterion and make his selection of the "appro-
priate" course of action on this basis.
The relationship between the Operations Analysis curriculum and the
problem analyzed lies in a definition of the purpose of Operations Anal-
ysis which is "to provide a quantitative basis for executive decision."
Paraphrase of a definition of the purpose of Operations Analysis,
Robert F. Rinehart, Journa 1 of Operations Research Society of
America „ 2 S 1954.

The author proposes that in this context, this thesis falls within
the province of Operations Analysis. More generally^ the author be-
lieves that every person who calls himself a citizen of a country has
an obligation to attempt to apply the discipline in which he has been




Conjecture a situation involving a conflict of interests between
two nations^ Nation I and Nation II. Nation I will be the nation making
a decision in the face of uncertainty. Nation I has a set of two pos-
sible courses of action (pure strategies) that it can pursue and its
list of the possible courses of action that it estimates II can pursue













Let the courses of action allowed have the following connotation:




is interpretable as conducive to a shooting war or hot
war
b is interpretable as conducive to a non-shooting war or
cold war
b_ is interpretable as conducive to a shooting war or
hot war
The possible situations which can occur may be described as:
(a^ b
1





(C, C), (C, H), (H, C), (H, H)
Where C represents cold war and H represents hot war.
Suppose that the order of preference for these situations by Nation
I is represented as:
(C, C)>(H 9 C)>(H S H)>(C, H)
8

with the meaning that the situation to the left of the symbol
is preferred (by I) to the situations to the right.
Subject to the general requirements of utility theory |2 : (1)
that preference shall be transitive, i.e., if A^>B and BT- C then
A^>C; (2) any gamble can be decomposed into its basic alternatives
according to the rules of probability calculus; and, (3) if there ex-
ists a gamble in which A is preferred to B and B to C, then there
shall exist a gamble involving A and C which is indifferent to B;
a quantification of these preferences by I can be indicated as follows:
(C, C) = +1
(H, H) = -1
(C, H) = a
(H, C) = b
with the meaning that the "value" of +1 attached to (C, C) is a stand-
ard of preference for a desirable situation, the "value" -1 attached to
(H, H) is a standard of preference for an undesirable situation. In the
example being considered a has a value less than -1 and b has a value
less than +1 and greater than -1. If all possible preference patterns
are considered, a and b are arbitrary real numbers, "values", assigned
to the situations (C, H) and (H, C> respectively relative to the stan-
dards +1 and -1.
For example^ we might consider a = -2 and b = H- 1/ 2 giving:
(C, C) >(H, C) ^ (H, H)>(C, H) since
+l> +l/2>-l>-2
or if b = +5 and a « -5
(H, C)>(C, C)>(H, H)>(C, H) since
+ 5>+l>-l>-5

A matrix representation of the conflict situation with associated pre-
ference values assigned by I would appear as illustrated in Fig, 1
where a and b are any real numbers
II' s courses of action
I's courses \
of action \ bi b,
*i +1 ^
a2 b -1
Conflict Situation Matrix and "Values" assigned by I
Figure 1
All the numerical figures in the matrix are assigned by Nation I
and as such are meaningful to it. They represent a value to I which
it associates with the possible outcomes of the various combinations
of courses of action available to I and II. These numerical values
are intended to reflect the "utility" to I of each of the possible
situations^ in the sense described by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa
in Games and Decisions 2 „ Nation I must choose an action based on
its estimate of which course of action or mixtures of courses of action
II is pursuing. I's choice will be that course of action or mixture
of courses of action which gives it the greatest expected return. Assum-
ing that I has no information or at best limited information on the
course of action II is pursuing, a reasonable procedure for it to follow
would be to observe II °s actions and from these observations estimate
what course of action II is pursuing. The observations represent the
stochastic process of the statistical decision problem 4
An observation by I of an action by II is represented as the
10

occurrence of one or the other of the pair b , b . We shall
identify this pair as C = (b
,
b ). The pair b and b re-
present the stochastic variables of the statistical decision process
. If II employs a mixture of its courses of action,, I may identify
this mixture as represented in Fig. 2 where Y denotes the relative
frequency (or odds) with which II is using b
,
and (1 - Y) the re-
lative frequency with which II is using b_. Inasmuch as I does not
know the value of Y, but knows that Y lies in the interval (0, 1)
we regard Y as a stochastic variable. Y represents the true distri-
bution
s
F, associated with one of the independent variables in the
stochastic process. The values of Y constitute the parameter space,
)l , of the statistical decision problem J4: . We shall consider
two cases
s




Odds assigned by I to C
Figure 2
For the case where Y is discrete, only certain values in the
interval (0 8 1) are allowed; these we shall designate by the notation
(y |n » 1, 2, ,N) where N is the number of discrete values of Y
n
in the interval (0, 1). When Y is discrete with N values, we have a
probability function f(y ) such that Pr (Y = y ) = f(y ) = P ,
n n n n
f(y ). After I observes II 8 s courses of action one or more times with
the results^ say, b occurring i times and b_ occurring j times,
the resulting a posteriori distribution which will be designated f. .(y ),ij n
is given by Bayes formula to be;
11
P i 0, £ P =1. Nation I's initial a priori estimate is

f ( y, ) y (1 - v ) J





Assuming stochastic independence of successive observations, the a
posteriori probability after any set of observations becomes I's a
priori estimate for the next observation. Nation I's initial a priori
estimate for the discrete case may be designated fn _ (y ) = f(y ),J & 0,0 VJV VJV
In the discrete case we shall consider several possibilities, namely:
Case (1) .
N * 2 ; Y can assume only two values say, y = and y 9 =
1 with probabilities P and P., respectively, as represented in





N = 2 showing probabilities that Y = y
n
Figure 3
A numerical example of this case is worked out in Chapter III using




= 1/4 The general results are that I requires only one observation
to change its a priori estimate to an a posteriori estimate in which
the probability one attaches to one or the other of II' s courses of




N = 3; Y can assume only the values, say, y„ 0, y_
such that 0<y
2
^l and y « 1 with probabilities P , P , P
,
respectively, as represented in Fig. 4 where the height of




N = 3 showing probabilities that Y » y
Figure 4
A numerical example of this case is worked out in Chapter III using
an initial a priori probability f (y ) m 1/3, f (y2 > = 1/6 and
f(y_) » 1/2. The general results are that the a priori estimate is
changed after one observation to an a posteriori probability in which
non-zero probabilities are assigned to either y and y? or to y~
and y_. As long as the opposite action is not observed in subsequent
observations, the probability remains distributed over y and y« or
over y_ and y with the probability on y or y increasing with
each observation. However^ as soon as an action indicating the opposite
course of action is observed, the a posteriori probability one attaches
to y~. In this situation all I knows is that II is pursuing a mixture
of courses of action, i.e. = y ? = 1, but the exact value of y„ he
does not know.
Case (3) .
N = 4; Y can assume only four values, say, y * 0, y. and
y such that < y2< y_< 1 and y, = 1 with probabilities P , P2 ,
13

P 3 P., respectively, as represented in Fig* 5, where the height of




N = 4, showing probabilities that Y y
Figure 5
A numerical example of this case is worked out in Chapter III using an
initial a priori probability f(y ) = 1/4, f(y
2
) * 1/4, f (y ) =
l/4 8 and f (y.) = 1/4. The general results are that the a priori
estimate is changed after one observation to an a posteriori probability
in which all the probability is distributed over either y., y~ and
y or over y_, y and y,. As long as the opposite action is not
observed in subsequent observations, the probability remains distributed
over either y., y„ and y_ or over y_, y and y with the pro-
bability on y. or y, increasing with each observation. However, as
soon as an action indicating the opposite course of action is observed,
the a posteriori probability assigns non-zero values to the two assumed
mixtures y^ and y . In this situation all I need estimate is that
11° s mixture of courses of action lies in a sector either to the left or
right of a mixture y* lying between y_ and y . The side to which
it lies is determined by the conjectured mixture, y„ or y , having
the greatest a posteriori probability.
We shall see in the discussion of expected return to I that if the
a +1
quantity r— lies in the interval (0,1), I need only estimate
a +1





the expected return to him. If lies outside this interval,
a + b *
I"s course of action or mixture of courses of action which maximizes
this expected return is uniquely determined.
When Y is continuous we consider all possible values in the in-
terval (0,1) and associate with this interval a probability density
function, f(y). Nation I's initial a priori estimate when Y is
continuous is f(y). After I observes II' s courses of action one or
more times with the results, say, b
1
occurring i times and b_ occur-
ring j times, the resulting a posteriori probability density function
is given by Bayes formula to be:
f(y) y' (1- y) J' for O* / S 1
(2.2) fu(y] -. Z ?_
eti iv- z " i " e\ he i c
I P( V' y
l 1~ y; Jdy
Assuming stochastic independence of successive observations, the a
posteriori probability density function after any set of observations
becomes the a priori estimate for the next observation. Nation I's
initial a priori estimate for the case where Y is continuous may be
designated as f n^^ = f(v )' ^s an example, if I regards all values
of Y as equally likely, then f(y) is uniform, i.e. f(y) = 1, and








A numerical example of this case is worked out in Chapter III using
an initial a priori density function f(y) which is uniform. The gen-
eral results are that the a priori probability density function is chang-
ed after each observation and the resulting a posteriori probability den-
sity function is biased in favor of the value of Y associated with
II "s course of action, b or b-, observed the greater number of times.
Up to this point we have been concerned with I's view of the set,
C » of courses of action, b and b , which I considers II is employ-
ing with probabilities Y and (1-Y), respectively. Let us now turn our
attention to the courses of action (a and a.) available to I. We
shall say that I has an action space consisting of a and a which
we shall identify as C * (a , a_). Nation I will employ either of
his courses of action a and a., or a mixture of his courses of action,
selecting that course of action or mixture of courses of action which is
"optimal" relevant to his estimate of II 's behavior. In this general
formulation of the conflict situation and the numerical examples which
follow we shall use the criterion that I will maximize his national in-
terests
s
that is to say, I will maximize the expected (average) "value"
of the return. We may identify, C , as represented in Fig. 7, where
x denotes the relative frequency with which I uses a. and (1-x) the





I°s action space showing the relative




We use a little x in this case since we are not dealing with a




ture of courses of action by I is indicated and or 1 otherwise,
depending on I's a posteriori estimate of Y. These three values of
x will be discussed in the discussion on the expected "value" of the
return to I.
Our matrix representation of the conflict situation, Fig. 1,
may now be represented as in Fig. 8.
(x-3) a
Conflict Situation Matrix showing "values"
assigned by I and Relative Frequencies of
C and C .
Figure 8
The expected (average) value of the return to I is a function of
the courses of action available to I and II which we shall designate by
the symbol E ! K(C , C ) E | K (C , C ) has the meaning
I i- J. JL
that considering all the possible situations (outcomes) that can occur
and the relative frequency with which they may occur, the expected
"value" of the return to I is the sum over all possible situations
which can occur with the value of each possible situation multiplied
by the frequency of occurrence of that situation. The term "expected"
17

value of the return to I is not to be interpreted as the value that
will necessarily obtain for a single occurrence of the conflict situa-
tions in which I uses a particular course of action against his parti-
cular estimate of the course of action II is pursuing, but rather may
be interpreted as a "value" of the return to I due to the uncertainty
as to which situation will prevail. As an example, consider the con-
flict situation represented by Fig. 8, its expected value is given by
equation (2.3).
(2.3) ELKCCijCn^-lxY+aKCl-YJ + bCl-xiY+f-Dd-xXl-V)
The quantity E in equation (2.3) is the function that I will
maximize with respect to x for his estimated value of Y. Fig. 9
is a pictorial representation over the a, b plane showing the values
for x for which E JK (C , C )j is maximized for the situation
represented in Fig. 8. The Fig. 9 results from a detailed analysis
of the "gains" to I which result from all possible combinations of
values of a and b. From equation (2.3) and Fig. 9 we see that
the value of x which maximizes E | K (C , C ) is determined not
from the specific value of Y estimated, but rather the relationship '
of the estimated Y to the quantity . The values, a and b,
a + b
it will be recalled, are the quantities assigned by I to the situations
(C h) an<* (H, C> and reflect his preferences for these outcomes of
the conflict situation.




line in Fig. 9, x can be set equal to any value in the interval
(0 8 1) and the expected "value" of the return to I is the same for
all values of x. A corresponding phenomenon occurs when I utilizes a
b +1





pected value of the return to I is the same as when Y = .
+ fc)
This provides I with a means of coping with a situation which arises
when an action is required of I prior to his estimation of the course
b • 1
of action II is pursuing, for if .— is in the interval (0,1) he
b +1
employs the mixture indicated by x = and the expected value of
the return to I is the same no matter which course of action II is pur-
suing. It will be recalled from Chapter I that to use this mixture I
must select that course of action a or a by means of some random
device, such as a spinner with the circumference partitioned in pro-
portion to the relative frequencies of utilization of a and a_.
Fig. 9 is also a pictorial representation of I's decision rules
for the use of his own courses of action, once he has enumerated his
own preference ordering, for it is noted that a particular preference
ordering is associated with only one Area of the a, b plane. For ex-
ample, in Area I only the following preference orderings are represented
1. (H, C)>(C, C)>(C, H)>(H, H)
2. (H, C)>(C, H)>(C, C)>(H, H)
3. (H, C)>(C, H)~(C, C)>(H, H)
4. (H, C) - (C, H)>(C, C)>(H, H)
5. (C, H)>(H, C) >(C, C)>(H, H)














when: Y< • x=0 |






-1 < a <= + oo
+ 1 < b < -"


























symbol is indifferent (I has equal preference for) to the situation to
the righto Areas II, III and IV have a similar preference pattern
lists, but different preference ordering.
a + 1
From Fig. 9, we see that except for the special case Y = ,
a + b
the action to be taken by I is a or a~ corresponding to x = 1 or
x s respectively. The decision by I in favor of a or a is based
on the knowledge of the "true" value of Y which Nation I presumably
does not know. Nation I is therefore confronted with estimating Y,
and with an estimate of Y he may use Fig. 9 to reach a decision in
favor of a. or a„. In the language of statistical decision theory,
I°s estimate of Y represents the terminal decision space, D ; the ter-
minal decision reached by I is then used in the game theoretic analysis
summarized in Fig. 9 to reach a point in the action space consisting of
a and a„. We will now turn to a consideration of I's problem of de-
ciding upon an estimate of Y. The rules which will be developed below
represent the statistical decision function of statistical decision
theory.
Let us first consider the case where Y is discrete. Suppose that
a sufficient number of observations on II' s courses of action have been
made so that the a posteriori probability f (y ) associated with a
particular discrete value y is greater than or equal to some value,
say ,9, which I considers sufficient for him to decide that the particu-
lar y is indeed the "true" value of Y. Then I uses the value of the
particular y for Y to enter Fig. 9 and comes to a decision in favor
of a or a„. This case in the language of statistical decision theory
is the case of making a point estimate of Y.
21

The decision procedure just described requires that a sufficient
number of observations have been made of II' s actions so that one of
the values of Y, say y , has achieved a "sufficient" probability^
say o9, to lead I to a point estimate of Y. This procedure will not
be satisfactory in two situations. The first of these is for the case
where Y is continuous. The second situation is the case where Y is
discrete but the requirement for a decision by I to use a or a_
arises before a sufficient number of observations have been obtained
to allow I to arrive at a point estimate of Y as described above.
For these cases an alternate criterion is suggested. It is based on
the maximization of the expected "value" of the return to I and the
fact that I need only estimate whether Y is less than or greater
than in order to select a or a„ so as to maximize the expect-
ed "value" of the return to him. In the discrete case I computes the
expected "value" of the return to him for all y if he uses a,,r
'n 1
and if he uses a_, and employs his course of action which gives him
the greater expected return. This expectation is computed with respect
to the a posteriori probabilities. We shall symbolize this as:
hi
(2.4) Choose c\ for which ^E(n k ,yn ) {[] ( yn ) is a
maximum for k - ] } 2 .
In the continuous case I follows a similar procedure to that described
for the discrete case except that (2.4) becomes:





Note that this alternate criterion differs from the procedure of making
a point estimate of Y in that it allows a decision to be made at any
22

time 9 i.e. before any observations have been made on II 's courses of
action or after any number of observations have been made,
A more sophisticated method I may use in deciding upon an estimate
Y is a complete analog of the Statistical Decision Problem considered
by Abraham Wald 4 in which the cost of experimentation and the cost of
a wrong decision must be considered after each observation when determin-
ing whether to act now or take another observation. The analogous com-
ponents for I to consider in his problem could be the "cost" of observa-
tions, this "cost" being either real or conjectured, and the "gain" which
would accrue to him if he took another observation. When the "cost" of
making another observation is greater than the "gain" to I, he makes his
estimate of Y. This case requires that "cost" and "gain" be commensur-






Let us suppose that a conflict of interest situation has arisen
between Nation I and Nation II wherein let us say Nation II is offer-
ing to supply arms to the Beta States. Additionally, let us suppose
that these same Beta States are engaged in open hostilities with their
neighbor Gamma. Nation I, which has declined to supply arms to either
side s considers that it is vital to its interests to prevent the supply
of arms to the Beta nations. In this situation let us consider that
Nation I has two courses of action available to it, namely:
(1) attempt to gain its objective without resort to open hostilities,
For example, this might be through the use of diplomatic chan-
nels only or the United Nations. This course of action we
shall call a , which is equivalent to a cold war course of
action.
(2) attempt to gain its objective by resorting to open hostilities.
For example, this might be through physically preventing the
receipt of such shipments by the Beta States. This course
of action we shall call a_, which is equivalent to a hot war
course of action.
Similarly Nation I conjectures that Nation II has two courses of action,
name ly
:
(1) attempt to gain its objective without resort to open hostili-
ties. This course of action we shall call b , which is
equivalent to a cold war course of action.
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(2) attempt to gain its objective through resort to open hostili-
ties. This course of action we shall call b«, which is equi-
valent to a hot war course of action.
Having set the stage let us now proceed to examine the various cases
discussed in the general formulation of the problem. First the case where
Y is discrete and the three cases enumerated under it.
Case (1)
N = 2; Y can assume only two values, y 1 and y~ ; y- =
and y 2 = 1
Assumptions
:





)>Uv b^Xa^ b2)>(ar b 2 )
or equivalently
(C, C)>(H, C)>(H, H)>(C, H)
(2) Quantification of Nation I's preference ordering:
+l>l/2>-l>-2
(3) Conjectured a priori probability:




Pr (Y = y2 ) = v*« y2
= l
Let us suppose that the first observation on Nation II' s courses
of action results in b
?






(2.1) f„( v ) =
Tf(yn)y r;;:- yn )
(3/4 )(1)
HI) + (1/4)
Tr> * i \/, — ——_
-
fQl(yz) tv^xn + a/^)(0)
(1AW0)
We see that after one observation, Nation I is enabled to estimate
that Y = and that Nation II is pursuing its hot war course of
action. It is interesting to note that all the a posteriori probability
would be on y. for an observation of b„ regardless of the a priori
probability assumed and on y„ for an observation of b .
Examination of Fig. 9 shows that Nation I's preference pattern
lies in Area III. In this area the decision rules for Nation I are:
a +1
(1) Y< ; select a , the hot war course of action.
a + b z
(2) Y> ; select a , the cold war course of action.
a *! x
In our case the quantity r*— = 2/3. and since Nation I has
a + b
estimated that Nation II 1 s course of action is b_(Y = 0), the ap-
propriate course of action for Nation I is a„. The expected "value"
of the return to Nation I from equation (2.3) is E
|
K (C , C )
* 3/2 (x + 1) • (0 - 2/3) + 1-1, which for x = is equal to
-1, and for x = 1 is equal to -2. From this we also see that









«= 1, and y = 1.
Assumptions
:









(C, C)>(H, C)>(H, H)>(C, H)
(2) Quantification of Nation I's preference ordering:
l>l/2>-l>-2
(3) Nation I conjectured that Nation II may be employing the
mixture of its courses of action represented by y_ = 1/3.





1/3: yl " °
f00 (y2 ) = Pr(Y = y 2 ) = 1/6; y2 - 1/3
l0,0^ ' Pr(Y " *3> " 1/2; *3 ' l
(5) Predetermined value which the a posteriori probability must
reach on a course of action or mixture of courses of action before
Nation I is willing to estimate that Nation II is following that particu-
lar course of action or mixture of courses of action is taken as .9.
Let us suppose that the first observation on Nation II' s courses
of action results in b
?
. The a posteriori estimate becomes:
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f ( ) -
UW11)
°'a yi
( 1/5 )CL) + d/6 )( ?/j; + (1/2XG)
(1/6) (2/.?)
ri(l)Ml/6)(2/5)+ (1/2XD)





73 (1/3)(1V (l/6)(?/3) + (1/2X0)
"
We see that from one observation Nation I is able to estimate
that Nation II is pursuing either its course of action b_ or the
ixture represented by y_ « 1/3. Had the first observation resultm
ed in b
,
Nation I would have been able to estimate that Nation II
was pursuing either its course of action b or the mixture represent-
ed by y2
= 1/3.
Inasmuch as the a posteriori probability, that associated with
y , is less than .9, Nation I makes another observation. Suppose
that this observation again results in b_. The a posteriori pro-
bability after this second observation is:
f






Since the a posteriori probability associated with y. is again less
than .9, Nation I makes another observation and will continue to make
observations until one of the a posteriori probabilities reaches .9.
As long as subsequent observations do not result in b., the a poster-
iori probabilities remain distributed over y and y? with the probabil-
ity over y increasing after each observation. The total number of
consecutive observations of b~ required such that f(y..) = .9,
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is four. Therefore, Nation I, after four observations, makes a
point estimate of Y = corresponding to II' s course of action
b~. However, as soon as b is observed, the a posteriori probability
of one attaches to y ? . For example supposing the third observation
on the actions of Nation II resulted in b., the resulting a posteriori
probability after this observation would be:
f
lj2 (yi ) = o
£i,2<y3> -
°
Application of Bayes theorem will show that as soon as the opposite
course of action from the one' originally observed is noted, the a poster-
iori probability of one attaches itself to y«. In this instance we
see that Nation I estimates that Nation II is pursuing a mixture of its
courses of action.
Examination of Fig. 9 shows that Nation I's preference pattern
lies in Area III. In this area the decision rules for Nation I are:
a t!
(1) Y< ; select a , the hot war course of action.
a + b *•
(2) Y> — ; select a., the cold war course of action.
In our case the quantity = 2/3. Therefore, for the instance
where Nation I estimates that Nation II is following a course of action
corresponding to Y = 0, the appropriate course of action for Nation I
is a„. The expected value of the return to Nation I from equation (2.3)
for x = is -1 and for x = 1 is -2. From this we also see
that Nation I's course of action a_ maximizes its expected return.
In the instance where Nation I estimates that Nation II is follow-
ing a mixture of courses of action corresponding to Y = 1/3, the
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appropriate course of action for Nation I is a„. The expected value
of the return to Nation I from equation (2.3) for x = is -1/2
and for x = 1 is -1. From this we also see that Nation I's course




N = 4; Y can assume only 4 values y., y~, y„, and y,
;
y, = 0, y„ and y such that «= y2
«= y <= 1, and y, = 1.
Assumptions
:









)>(a 2> b^Xa^ t> 2 )
or equivalently
(C, C) > (H, H) > (H, C) >(C, H)
(2) Quantification of Nation I's preference ordering:
+1> -l>-2>-3
(3) Nation I conjectures that Nation II may be employing the
ixtures of its courses of action represented by y_ = 2/7 and y
= 6/7.
(4) Predetermined value which the a posteriori probability must
reach on a course of action or mixture of courses of action before
Nation I is willing to estimate that Nation II is following that parti-
cular course of action or mixture of courses of action is taken as .9.













* y 3 )
m 1/4; y3 " 6/7
£0,0<V " Pr(Y " V " 1/4; H - l -
Let us suppose that the first observation on Nation II' s courses













We see that from one observation Nation I is able to estimate that
Nation II is pursuing either its course of action b or a mixture of
its courses of action.
Inasmuch as the greatest a posteriori probability, that associated
with y , is less than .9, Nation I makes another observation. Suppose
that this observation results in b . The a posteriori probability after
this second observation is:
f
i,i<*i> °
fM (y2 > = 5/8
f11 (y3) = 3/8
Ei,i<V - °-
We see that when both of the courses of action b. and b have
been observed, the a posteriori probability assigns zero probabilities
to y. =0 and y, = 1. However, had the second and all subsequent
observations resulted in b , the a posteriori probabilities would have
remained distributed over y~, y and y with the maximum probability on
V
Let us suppose that after two observations Nation I is required to
implement one of its courses of action and suppose the observations have
been b. and b_. Since insufficient observations have been obtained for
Nation I to arrive at a point estimate of Y on the basis of an a poster -
iori probability greater than or equal to .9, I uses an alternate pro-
cedure in order to select the appropriate course of action. This alter-
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nate procedure is defined as follows:
(2.4) choose -a k for which /E(a|<,yn ;-PL j vy f is a
imximum for K = 1,2.
In the example under consideration we see that:
gE^Vn^iW = Efei 3yi)(0) + ECdlDy2)C5/8) ' E(al3 y3)(3/S) + Efe^y^O)
= L"« + b; x - —-— y2 + - 1 1 (a/8)
r/ , \ / b ^\/ d*lS (b+l)(a-tl)
= C+5(l-l/5)(2//-P/5"; -2/5 -13 (5/£) +





§.E^,yn )^(yn> Efe2)il)W) - Efa„,,yJ(5/S) +E (a„y5 ),'3/a) + 1 . . ,,
)
- St/56
Since 2. IK^. yh ) +\ , I , is greater than ^E Cs^ 5 yn )-f(_j (yn ) ,
Nation I employs his course of action a..
In this case we see that II' s mixture of courses of action having
the greatest a posteriori probability, y_, lies in the sector to the
left of y* and also this same mixture is less than which is
a* b
equal to 2/5. Under the simple criterion of selecting a point estimate
y for Y for which the associated a posteriori probability ^ iA (y )
is greatest, I would have been lead to select action a„. Under the
criterion of maximizing the expected value of return, Nation I is lead
to selecting a . Note, however, that the a posteriori probability on




y been greater than or equal to .9, Nation I would have also been











bp > (av b x ) > (av b,,) > (a,,, bp
or equivalent ly
(H, C) > (C, C)>(C, H) (H, H)
(2) Quantification of Nation I's preference ordering:
+5 +1>0>-1
(3) Conjectured a priori probability density function,
f(y), uniform, i.e. f(y) = 1 for ^ y 1, and is
zero elsewhere.
Let us suppose that the first observation on Nation II *s courses
of action results in b. . The a posteriori probability density func-
tion is by Bayes formula,
,o ^ r , \
tiy) (y) c (l-y) j -for 0*>/*l
(2.2) fLj (y) s ^
/ ! ; ana zero elsewhere
n - , (1) V
1 (1-7^° for 0^ v *3
\ (y) s -7 —
-
Z\f
1 //„s 1,, v*. and zero elsewhere
;
l-U y ( i~ y) u
y
&






A Posteriori Probability Density Function of




Note that as a result of the single observation, the conjectured
a priori probability density function is changed to an a posteriori
probability density function biased in favor of the value of 1. Had
the observation been b_ the a posteriori probability density function
would have been biased in favor of zero.
In that case:
(Diyfa-yf forOty % 1
u>1 J ' 7 &r\d zero elsewh* i
Kl)(y) (l-jyfdy




A Posteriori Probability Density Function
of Y after observation of b
?
Figure 11
Let us suppose that Nation I after one observation is required
to implement one of its courses of action. Nation I uses the alter-
nate procedure to decide which of its courses of action to utilize.
The alternate procedure for the continuous case is:
(2.5) Choose a for which i Efa^^y ) f(j Cy)dy
is a maximum for K e i.j2,















'Efe^y )^,o(y) ' is greater than E^,.y)f1)r (y)dy ,
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